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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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a conviction, or where the solicitor had failed to give notice for the
production of documentary evidence which he deemed essential to the
establishment of the state's case,4 6 and finally, the circumstances of the
present case, where the state procured a mistrial in order to obtain the
testimony of witnesses not available at the trial.
The principal case is wholly consistent with prior North Carolina
decisions; however, here for the first time, the Supreme Court of the
United States has affirmed the application of the North Carolina rule
of discretion in an extreme case. Should a case with similar facts
come before the North Carolina court again, it is submitted that the
present procedure should be re-examined to assure that the fundamental
rights of the defendant are not violated.
JAMEs

T.

HEDRICK

Insurance-Accident Policies-Construction of "Accidental Means"
inPolicy
Deceased was insured under a health and accident policy the pertinent clauses of which provided indemnity against ". . . bodily injuries
sustained ...through purely accidental means ...independently and
exclusively of disease and all other causes. . " On the date of his
death he was employed by a roofing company and engaged in shingling
a house. Following a brief rest in the shade he ascended a ladder
carrying a 70-pound bundle of shingles, reached the top, and in attempting to move the bundle higher on the roof, collapsed and slumped over
it. Minutes later he was dead. The coroner's report showed death to
have resulted from acute coronary occlusion antecedently produced by
heat exhaustion.
In beneficiary's action on the policy the jury found that (1) death
resulted from bodily injuries, (2) such injuries resulted in death independently and exclusively of disease and all other causes, (3) such
injuries resulted through purely accidental means, and (4) death was
not caused solely by coronary occlusion but that heat exhaustion and
" In State v. Dove, 222 N. C. 162, 22 S. E. 2d 231 (1942), the solicitor moved
to be permitted to offer additional evidence at a later trial since such evidence was
not then available. The trial court ordered a mistrial over the defendant's objection. On appeal, the action was affirmed, and, since the ordering of a mistrial
in cases of felonies less than capital is discretionary, the appeal is premature. State
v. Guice, 201 N. C. 761, 161 S. E. 533 (1931) ; State v. Andrews, 166 N. C. 349,
81 S. E. 416 (1914) ; State v. Weaver, 35 N. C. 204 (1891).
4"In
State v. Collins, 115 N. C. 716, 20 S. E. 452 (1894), the solicitor requested the withdrawal of a juror and time allowed to serve the defendant with
notice to produce an order which the solicitor deemed essential to the~state's case.
The withdrawal was ordered and this action was affirmed on appeal since a mistrial
in a case not capital is a matter of discretion.
1 109 N. E. 2d 649 (Ohio 1952).
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coronary occlusion contributed to cause death. These findings were
affirmed by a divided court in Hammer v. Mutual Benefit Health and
Accident Ass'n.2
And so arise again the oft-litigated and much disputed questions of
the line of demarcation between injury and disease, and of the interpre-

tation to be given the term "accidental means" 3 in an accident 4 insurance
policy. These questions have plagued the courts for over sixty years.
The authorities have taken hopelessly irreconcilable positions; consequently it is deemed necessary that a general analysis of the applicable
law be propounded.
Accidental Injury as Contrasted with Disease. It frequently occurs
that deceased suffered what is admittedly an "accident" within the meaning of that term, 6 but the result is further complicated by reason of a
previously existing and independent disease, or by a disease which is
directly produced by the accident. Such cases fall within one of four
categories, following:
(1) "When an accident caused a diseased condition, which together
with the accident resulted in the injury or death complained of, the
accident alone is to be considered the cause of the injury or death."
Thus, where deceased suffered coronary occlusion due to the strained
position of his body as he wielded a blowtorch on a tank, recovery was
allowed on the theory that the accident, i.e., strain, produced the diseased condition, i.e., coronary occlusion.8
(2) "When at the time of the accident the insured was suffering
from some disease, but the disease had no causal connection with the
injury or death resulting from the accident, the accident is to be considered as the sole cause."" Accordingly, recovery was allowed where
Hammer v. Mutual Ben. Health and Acc. Ass'n., supra note 1.
-

'The vast majority of cases examined involved policies containing the
clauses, "accidental means" or "external, violent, and accidental means." Such
policies do not insure against mere accidental injury or death, but rather injury
or death effected through "accidental means."
'Some of the cases herein cited involve the construction of similar clauses in
the accident provisions (double indemnity) of life insurance policies.
'The policies under consideration do not purport to insure against bodily injuries caused by disease.
' "An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event." WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY (2d ed. 1940).
"Penn v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 399, 405, 76 S.E. 262, 263 (1912);
Harris v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 193 N. C. 485, 137 S.E. 430 (1937);
Bouchard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 135 Me. 238. 194 Atl. 405 (1937) ; Hutchinson v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 182 Ore. 639, 189 P. 2d 586 (1948) ; 1 APPLEMAN, INsURANCE
LAW AND PRAcric § 404 (1941).
'Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Fairchild, 215 Ark. 416, 220 S. W. 2d 803

(1949).

' Penn v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 399, 405, 76 S.E. 262, 263 (1912):
Harris v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 193 N. C. 485, 137 S.E. 430 (1927) ; Bouchard
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 135 Me. 238, 194 Atl. 405 (1937) ; Hutchinson v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co.. 182 Ore. 639. 189 P. 2d 586 (1948) ; 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 403 (1941).
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death resulted from brain concussion following a fall, although deceased was afflicted with nephritis (inflammation of the kidneys) at the
time. 10
(3) "When at the time of the accident there was an existing disease, which, cooperating with the accident, resulted in the injury or
death, the accident cannot be considered as the sole cause or as the cause
independent of all other causes."'"
Recovery has been denied under
this rule where deceased had previously suffered a severe attack of
angina pectoris, then suffered a second and fatal one due to sudden
strain ;12 and where adhesions, present for twenty years following an
appendectomy, were aggravated by a blow in the side incurred when
deceased fell. 13 The courts in both cases found that the previously
existing conditions cooperated with the accidents to cause death.
(4) When a pathological condition itself caused the accident which
resulted in injury or death, at least one opinion has intimated that the
accident alone is to be considered the cause of the injury or death.' 4
Thus, if one subject to dizzy spells suffers one and fractures his skull in
a resulting fall, the fall alone will be considered the cause of the injury
or death. However, this latter category has not generally been treated
by the majority decisions.
Thus it can readily be seen that the facts in each particular case
assume paramount importance, with the ultimate determination of
liability or lack thereof dependent in large measure upon acceptance or
rejection of expert medical testimony.
Exterzal, Violent, and Accidental Means. It must be remembered
that the overwhelming majority of policies insure against not merely
accidental injury or death, but rather injury or death effected solely
through external, violent, and accidental means. 15 Hence the interpretations assume importance. This clause is less susceptible of analysis
10 Bristol v. Mutual Ben. Health and Ace. Ass'n., 305 Mich. 145, 9 N. W. 2d
38 (1943); accord, North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Allentharp, 164 F. 2d 9
(10th Cir. 1947) (action for disability benefits).
" Penn. v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 399, 405, 76 S. E. 262, 263 (1912);
Harris v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 193 N. C. 485, 137 S. E. 430 (1927) ; Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Gaines, 271 Ky. 496, 112 S. W. 2d 666 (1938) ; Bouchard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 135 Me. 238, 194 Atl. 405 (1937); McQuade v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 166 Misc. 524, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 647 (1938) ; Hutchinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co,
182 Ore. 639, 189 P. 2d 586 (1948); 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACricE §403 (1941). Contra: Preston v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 F. 2d 10 (7th
Cir. 1949); Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 305, 163 P. 2d 689
(1945) ; Rebenstorf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 Ill. App. 71, 19 N. E. 2d
420 (1939).
1 Schroeder v. Police and Firemen's Ins. Ass'n., 300 Ill. App. 375, 21 N. E.
2d 16 (1939).
"' Hutchinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 182 Ore. 639, 189 P. 2d 586 (1948).
"See Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 94 Utah 532, 554, 72 P. 2d

1060, 1070 (1937)

(dissenting opinion wherein the writer reasons that ".

chain of cause and effect should start from and not before the injury.").
'"

See note 3, supra.

.

. the
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than that previously considered, one court frankly stating that there are
about as many different constructions of it as there are companies

writing this type insurance.1 6 Comparatively speaking, the terms "ex-

ternal" and "violent" cause little trouble, 17 the major difficulty centering around the definition or interpretation to be given the term "accidental means." This has proven true as predicted in the staid comment
of Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life
Insurance Co.,' 8 that "The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a
Serbonian Bog."
Nevertheless, the courts have taken opposite positions, the majority
holding that there is a distinction between accidental means and accidental results, and that both elements are requisites for recovery under
such a policy. 19 In other words, not only must the injury or death be
accidental, but also the means which produced that result must be accidental. These courts recognize the rule that a contract is to be construed
most strongly against the party preparing it, but refuse to extend unambiguous terminology in favor of the insured. Among their reasons
20
are the fact that accidental injury or death alone is not insured against,
and that the low cost premiums generally prevailing in this field make
2
extension of coverage unjust. '

Under the majority rule decisions it is held that where the insured
does a voluntary and intended act in the manner in which he intended,
there can be no recovery in the event of accidental injury or death,
the means in such case not being accidental.2 2 Closely akin to this rule
are three qualifications on it. First. Even if insured's act be voluntary, the means employed can still be accidental if he proceeded with
ignorance of a material fact. 23 Thus, where deceased engaged in an
8

See Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 94 Utah 532, 560, 72 P. 2d
1060, 1073 (1937) (concurring opinion).
" 1 APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 393 (1941); VANCE, INsiJRANcE 879 (Zd ed. 1930).
" 291 U. S. 491, 499 (1934) (Mr. Justice Cardozo went on to say, "When a
man has died in such a way that his death is spoken of as an accident, he has
died because of an accident, and hence by accidental means." (Italics supplied.)
.-" Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491 (1934) ; United
States Mut. Acc. Ass'n. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100 (1889) ; Inter-Ocean Casualty
Co. v. Foster, 226 Ala. 348. 147 So. 127 (1933) ; Fletcher v. Security Life and
Trust Co., 220 N. C. 148, 16 S. E. 2d 687 (1941); Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
208 N. C. 160, 179 S. E. 434 (1935) ; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Johnson,
91 Ohio St. 155, 110 N. E. 475 (1914).
SLandress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491 (1934) ; Szymanska
v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 7 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 272, 183 AtI. 309 (1936) ;
Fletcher v. Security Life and Trust Co., 220 N. C. 148. 16 S. E. 2d 687 (1941).
"Tohn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 181 Md. 140, 28 A. 2d 856
(1942).
" See note 19, mtpra:
Cir. 1928) (by implication):
21 Pope v. Prudential Ins. Co., 29 F. 2d 185 (6th
Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Maddox 184 Tenn. 70, 195 S. W. 2d 536
(1946).
"
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affray with a policeman not in uniform, ignorant of the officer's status,
beneficiary was allowed recovery for her husband's ensuing death. 24
Second. Where injury or death is not the natural, probable, or expected result of insured's voluntary act, but nevertheless occurs, the
means will be held accidental. 25 So where deceased, the aggressor in a
fist fight, received a fractured skull when knocked to the pavement,
insurer was held liable. 26 Third. Where some vis major or misadventure enters the voluntary act undertaken by insured, this too will
constitute the means accidental 27 Accordingly, recovery was allowed
where deceased died from brain inflammation following the puncture of
a pimple on his lip, the vis major being the driving of germs beneath the
skin during the voluntary act of puncturing the pimple. 28
On the other hand, several courts, though recognizing the difference
between the terms "means" and "results," have flatly and frankly refused to draw any legal distinction between them.29 .Consequently,
where there has been an accidental injury or death, and notwithstanding
the means effectuating it, insured or his beneficiary is allowed recovery
even though the policy expressly provided that in order to recover, such
injury or death must have been effected solely through external, violent,
and accidental means. The rationale behind these decisions is that the
public for whom the policies are written do not understand such super'Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Maddox, supra note 23.

"5United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100 (1889); InterOcean Cas. Co. v. Foster, 226 Ala. 348, 147 So. 127 (1933) ; Rooney v. Mutual
Ben. Health and Acc. Ass'n. 74 Cal. App. 2d 885, 170 P. 2d 72 (1946) ; Akins v.
Illinois Bankers Life Assur. Co., 166 Kan. 648, 203 P. 2d 180 (1949) ; Pyramid
Life Ins. Co. v. Milner, 289 Ky. 249, 158 S.W. 2d 429 (1942) ; Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Fagan, 292 Ky. 533, 166 S.W. 2d 1007 (1942) ; North Amer. Acc. Ins.
Co. v. Henderson, 180 Miss. 894, 177 So. 528 (1937) ; Korfin v. Continental Cas.
Co., 5 N. J. 154, 74 A. 2d 312 (1950); Fletcher v. Security Life and Trust Co.,
220 N. C. 148, 16 S.E. 2d 687 (1941); Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183
S. C. 199, 190 S. E. 451 (1937); McMahon v. Mutual Ben. Health and Acc.
Ass'n.,
33 Wash. 2d 415, 206 P. 2d 292 (1949).
20
Rooney v. Mutual Ben. Health and Acc. Ass'n., supra note 25.
- Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491 (1934); Smith v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 24 Tenn. App. 570, 147 S. W. 2d 1058 (1940); Provident
Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 23 Tenn. App. 697, 137 S.W. 2d 888 (1939)
Stone v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 133 Tenn. 672, 182 S. W. 252 (1916);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schlakzug, 143 Tex. 264, 183 S.W. 2d 709 (1944);
International Travelers' Ass'n. v. Francis, 119 Tex. 1, 23 S.W. 2d 282 (1930).
" Lewis v. Ocean Acc. and Guaranty Co., 224 N. Y. 18, 120 N. E. 56 (1918).
-" Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N. W. 2d 576 (1942);
Caffaro
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 N. J. Misc. 167, 183 Atl. 200 (1936); Burr r.
Commercial Travelers' Mut. Ace. Ass'n., 295 N. Y. 294, 67 N. E. 2d 248 (1946),
noted in 13 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 65' (1947); Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
273 N. Y. 140, 7 N. E. 2d 18 (1937) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hazen, 182 Okla.
623, 79 P. 2d 577 (1938); Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla.
591. 46 P. 2d 372 (1935); O'Neil v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 Idaho 722, 152
P. 2d 707 (1944) ; Comfort v. Continental Casualty Co., 239 Iowa 1206, 34 N. W.
2d 588 (1948).
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refinements ,3 the distinction is illogical;81 .and the clauses are not
readily distinguishable. 82
The Hammer case falls within the majority rule both as regards
injury contrasted with disease, and as to the distinction placed on the
term accidental means. The court there held heat exhaustion to be
an injury rather than a disease,3 3 and found the accidental means in the
rays of the sun rather than in the heat exhaustion itself.
Disregarding any possible social justification, it is submitted that, in
view of the freedom of the parties to contract as they will, and the unambiguous language of the policies, the rules adopted by the majority
decisions are those most consonant with settled legal principles.
HAL W.

BROADFOOT

Judgment-Vacation Because of Surprise or Excusable Neglect
G. S. 1-220 provides, in part, that:
"The judge shall, upon such terms as may be just, at any time
within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment,
order, verdict or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect...."
In 1883, Justice Ashe noted the great number of appeals based on
the above statute, commenting, "...
and still they come."' The statement is appropriate at the present time.2 As the appeals are "still
coming," a brief recapitulation of cases in which the statute is involved
seems to be in order.
The relief provided by the terms of G. S. 1-220 must be sought by
a motion in the cause and cannot be had in an independent action.8
20 Burr v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n., 295 N. Y. 294, 301, 67
N. E. 2d 248, 251 (1946) ("Our guide must be the reasonable expectation and

purpose of the ordinary business man when making an insurance contract. .. ").

("Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 48, 2 N. W. 2d 576, 580 (1942)

" . . the distinction between accidental result and accidental means cannot be

said to exist.").
"2Comfort v. Continental Casualty Co., 239 Iowa 1206, 34 N. W. 2d 588
(1948) ; Miser v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 223 Iowa 662, 273 N. W.
155 (1937) ; Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 184 Iowa 423, 429,
166 N. W. 363, 366 (1918) (".... the meaning of these words in law differs in
no essential respect from the meaning attributed to them in popular speech.").

" The bulk of American authorities refuse to apply a pathological definition

to the term, "sunstroke," holding instead that same is an accident within the
meaning of an insurance policy. Lower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 111 N. J. L.
426, 168 Atl. 592 (1933); Continental Casualty Co. v. Clark, 70 Okla. 187, 173
P. 453 (1918); Richards v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017
(1921); 1 APPLEMAN, INSuRAN E: LAW AND PRAcricE § 447 (1941).
Contra:
Dozier v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 46 Fed. 446 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1891).
'Kivett v. Wynne, 89 N. C. 39, 41 (1883).
20
Over 175 cases involving relief sought under the statute have been decided
since 1883. an average of more than two cases per year.
'Ins. Co. v. Scott, 136 N. C. 157, 48 S. E. 581 (1904) ; Walker v. Gurley, 83
N. C. 429 (1880).

